


Port Security Waterside Protection




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Outline

- Measures and Recommendations
- The Waterfront Plan
- Waterfront/Port Security Overview
- Waterside Barriers
- Barrier Criteria Issues
- Traditional Security Measures-Enhanced
- Port Security-Summary
- Questions




Waterside Security Measures & Recommendations

Existing Measures

- Minimal Lighting
- Communication Cabling (Ship to Shore)
- Pier access control, which includes guard shack, vehicle barrier/gate, and fencing
- Telephone
- Fire Alarm


Proposed Measures

- Waterside Barriersunder development
- Waterside Watch Tower
- Increased Waterside Security Lighting
- Expanded
 Communications
 Cabling System for
 waterside surveillance
- Increased Harbor Patrols



The Waterfront Plan

THE WATERFRONT PLAN






Waterfront/Port Security Overview










WARNING US NAVY RESTRICTED AREA KEEP OUT USE OF FORCE AUTHORIZED

WATERFRONT SECURITY










COMMUNICATIONS

LIGHTING







Waterside Barriers





ONE ELEMENT OF AN INTEGRATED SECURITY SYSTEM TO DETER ATTACK AGAINST NAVAL ASSETS







Waterside Barrier Requirements

Objective

Protect Navy ships from attack by explosive-laden, high-speed boats




Threat Definition

- Threat definition is difficult due to the extraordinary variety of boats and submersibles available.
- ➤ No official criteria/ threat definition for waterfront barriers (MILSPEC, DoD directive, MNS/ORD, etc.)
- ➤ OPNAVINST C8126.1 (Navy Nuclear Weapons Security Manual) in revision
- Large, low-speed boats and underwater threats excluded



Barrier Effectiveness

Boundaries



- Visible Line Only
- Line of buoys
- Float line

Barriers –



Doesn't stop

• Dunlop (21-in)

boat

Tuffloat

- Probably doesn't stop
- Pontoons
- boat

- Might not stop boat
- Composite camel
- Yokohama fenders
- Dunlop (6-ft)

- Stops boat
- Net w/ piles
- Port Security **Barrier**
- Dunlop (8-ft)

- SeaBarrier
- Yodock
- Whisperwave



Float Line



- Locally fabricated from COTS components.
- Will not stop intentional surface craft attack
- Defines restricted area
- Helps identify INTENT intent if violated?
- Unknown long-term performance in ocean environment





Category 1 Barriers

DUNLOP



- Pneumatic rubber bladder
- 8 ft dia x 80 ft long 1800 lbs

Port Security Barrier-PSB



- Steel pontoon support structure with synthetic boat capture net
- 8 ft height x 50 ft long 8500 lbs
- Secondary net capability (14-ft total height)



Barrier History

DUNLOP



- 10 year use in UK with Dunlop (6-ft) bladder
- Commercial Product (pneumatic rubber bladder w/ internal reinforcing wire)

PSB



27 month test (3 units) of an early PSB design



Dunlop Floating Bladders

2












Port Security Barrier









1




PSB Seakeeping Tests



(1-ft model)

 Extensive physical model testing was conducted by the U.S. Naval Academy to verify the design.

(5-ft models)







PSB Units



The barrier units are each 50 feet long, weight 8,500 pounds and float on 3.5-foot diameter pontoons. A stopping net, that works on the same principle a aircraft carrier arresting gear, extends 8 feet above the water.



ECOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

PSB units are designed to float high in the water and have smooth surfaces for easy marine mammal passage. The pontoons are parallel to current flow and to the direction of gate opening for low resistance.

Deadweight anchors are used in case a barrier needs to be relocated.



PONTOONS

CANOE/KAYAK BARRIERS




Connectors

MCA CONNECTORS AT **BUOYS**

Several different types of connectors are being tested in this prototype installation.

Connections between units is critical because the system was designed to withstand extreme hurricane winds and waves.





Barrier Operability/Handling

DUNLOP

 Air-filled bladder easily deflated for storage and shipment



 Units can be dragged in/out of water

<u>PSB</u>

- Gate opening loads at maximum operating condition (35kts) is 1/3 to 1/2 that for DUNLOP
- Mooring loads (and mooring hardware size) at a typical survival condition (100 kts) is about 1/2 that for DUNLOP --
- Crane required for handling


Handling Experience: Both barrier system gates can be handled easily with small boats (whaler, mike boat) in mild weather; larger boat is required for winds above 15-20kts. A small tug is being used at the initial test site.



500-FOOT GATE OPERATION

Initial tests showed a **Boston Whaler or small** tug could open/close the 500-foot gate in calm conditions. Testing will be conducted under various conditions to determine the optimum craft for gate operation. This barrier will be monitored to evaluate long-term performance.






Durability/Maintenance

DUNLOP

- 6-ft Dunlop deployed for about 10 years in UK with good maintenance record
- 20 Year rubber life expectancy
- Issues:
 - Pneumatic integrity: Air valve integrity; End cap overstress; End cap seal; Module seam integrity
 - > Temperature effects

PSB


- Steel pontoon structure painted with ZINC CLAD-11 (80% ZINC water-based -\$13/ft²); 15-20 year life expected with 3-5 yr repaint
- Nylon net is UV protected; 3-5 year life expectancy anticipated
- Issues:
 - ➤ Paint quality control:
 20% of initial test PSB pontoons show rust. Inadequate paint thickness; Q/A issue; some units to be recoated
 - > Gate connection
- Mooring and connecting system inspection and maintenance cycle would be similar for each barrier system



Costs

<u>Barrier</u>	Initial Cost (\$/ft)	Barrier Life Expectancy (yrs)	Annual Maintenance (\$/ft)	Net Present Value (today's \$/ft)
Dunlop	\$1,248	20	\$21	\$1,500
Port Security Barrier	\$800	20	\$28	\$1,144

- PSB & Dunlop costs based on awarded contracts
- Costs include initial costs, moorings, connectors, installation, inspection and maintenance.
- Not included are engineering, design, boats/labor to open/close gates.



Other Considerations

<u>DUNLOP</u>

- Simple construction
- Low radar signature
- Mainly thin rubber; vulnerable to cutting
- Current/waves have little effect
- Anticipated good behavior in ice
- Requires gap closure unit between fenders
- Field repair (patching) possible
- Units are self-fendering


<u>PSB</u>


- Can be modified to meet new needs
- Allows passage of debris and fish
- Steel pontoon structure provides a level of protection in itself
- High radar signature
- Good visibility through net
- Fenders needed on units near gate buoys to protect boats




Category 3-4 Barriers













TUFFLOAT Safety/Debris Barrier



- Commercial Product
- Will not stop intentional surface craft attack
- Defines restricted area
- Identifies INTENT if violated







Category 4 Barriers




BLUE BARREL BARRIER

4




JERSEY BARRIER



Findings/Recommendations

- Barrier demos/installations completed or in process
- Issues such as <u>Quality Assurance and Design</u> identified for both Dunlop and PSB units currently being addressed
- Continued monitoring required to: <u>refine systems</u>, <u>improve operations</u>, <u>define maintenance requirements</u>
- Barrier handling boat should be provided to support barrier operations: <u>Suitable tug identified</u>
- Barrier inspection should be added to <u>Fleet Mooring</u> <u>Inspection Program</u>



Barrier Criteria Issues

- THREAT
- BARRIER EFFECTIVENESS
- ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN CRITERIA
- MOORING DESIGN CRITERIA
- PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
- PERMITTING
- COSTS BOTH INITIAL AND LIFE CYCLE
- OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE



Watch Tower and Guard Houses













Gate Barriers












Waterside Security Lighting and Communication













Three-Sided Signage, Typical





INCREASED HARBOR PATROL













Port Security

...a program which synchronizes select security programs into comprehensive defensive measures to protect our personnel, information, and critical resources against a wide range of threat attacks, including terrorists, criminals, and saboteurs.





Questions And Concerns



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Security Engineering E-Net website

http://navfacilitator.navfac.navy.mil/cheng/enet/tdls/security/security.cfm